We consider a system in which a single finished good is assembled from two components. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and stationary, and procurement and assembly leadtimes are constant. Unsatisfied demand is backordered. The inventory of each component or assembly is controlled by a separate firm using a base-stock policy. Each firm is charged holding costs on its own inventory plus a share of the shortage cost due to backorders of the finished product.
Introduction
Managing component and finished goods inventories in a decentralized supply chain associated with an assembled product is a complex task. Performance of the overall system depends on independent decision makers, each seeking to maximize his own benefit. Since assembly systems involve issues of horizontal balance (between component inventory levels) in addition to vertical coordination (having sufficient stock to meet downstream demands), the impact of decentralized decision making in this setting is not immediately clear. We seek to explore the behavior of such systems, and to assess whether the insights from previous research on centralized assembly systems or decentralized series systems apply to them.
We consider a system in which a single finished good is assembled from two components, with one unit of each component required to produce each unit of finished good. The system experiences stochastic demand for the finished product, and this demand is stationary and independent across time. Unsatisfied demand is backordered. There are constant leadtimes associated with procurement of components and with assembly of the finished product.
Decisions in the system are decentralized -the ordering decision for each item is controlled by a different firm, each using a version of a base-stock policy. Each firm incurs holding costs on its own inventory, plus a share of the shortage costs due to backorders of the finished product.
We consider two main versions of the basic system. In the first version each firm follows an echelon base-stock policy, while in the second each firm follows a local base-stock policy.
For both versions we show that a Nash equilibrium exists, and we describe some properties of the equilibrium base-stock levels.
Starting with the echelon game, we explore the possibility of the component firm with the shorter leadtime using information about the other component firm's pipeline inventory.
We show that using this information will always yield a benefit -not only to the firm using it, but also to the other firms in the system. We provide some numerical results to estimate the magnitude of the benefit. We also observe that the way that firm uses the information to modify its orders matches the policy structure shown by Rosling (1989) to be optimal in an assembly system with centralized decision making. Under centralized decision making, Rosling also shows that an assembly system is equivalent to a related series system. Under decentralized decision making, however, we show that this equivalence no longer holds.
For the local game, we also explore the use of pipeline information and the relationship between the assembly system and a related series system. In contrast to the echelon game,
we find examples where the use of pipeline information (and the corresponding adjustment of base-stock levels) actually increases costs for some firms (including the firm that uses the information). Also, in the assembly system the component firms' local base-stock levels are economic complements -selection of a higher base-stock level by one firm provides incentive to the other firm to raise its base-stock level. This contrasts with behavior in the related (in the sense of Rosling) series system, where the base-stock levels are substitutes. Since complementary base-stock levels facilitate the use of supermodular game techniques (e.g., to compute the equilibrium, to derive comparative statics results), this system provides a somewhat unusual example of a situation in which an assembly system has nicer structural properties than a related series system.
In general the equilibrium base-stock vector for each of these games is not the same as the optimal base-stock vector for a similar system with a central decision maker. However, we describe a system of linear transfer payments that coordinates the supply chain.
A number of papers consider single-period decentralized assembly systems, in which production or capacity decisions are made prior to the realization of demand. Gurnani and Gerchak (1998) consider an assembly system where production yield for components is uncertain and demand for the finished product is deterministic. They identify two types of contracts that allow the system to match the performance of a centralized assembly system.
The contracts specify penalties to the suppliers for not meeting the assembler's order. Wang and Gerchak (2003) study a decentralized assembly system with perfect component yield and stochastic demand for the end product, where the suppliers make capacity decisions for the production of components. The authors identify a capacity-subsidy contract that coordinates the channel under certain conditions. Bernstein and DeCroix (2002) characterize equilibrium price and capacity decisions in a multi-tier modular assembly system, and then use that characterization to derive results regarding the design of the assembly system. All existing research on multi-period assembly systems assumes a centralized decision maker. Schmidt and Nahmias (1985) investigate a finite-horizon model of an assembly system with two components. They characterize the optimal ordering policy under general assumptions on leadtimes and initial stock levels, by showing that the multi-echelon series system decomposition result in Clark and Scarf (1960) extends to the assembly system. For a general assembly system over an infinite horizon, Rosling (1989) derives an optimal policy under a restriction on the initial stock levels. Under this initial condition, he shows that the assembly system can be reduced to an equivalent series system. Consequently, the seriessystem methods in Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) and Chen and Zheng (1994) can be used to compute the optimal policy for the assembly system. See Zipkin (2000) for a more detailed discussion of these results.
Several recent papers study multi-echelon series systems where each stage incurs a portion of the entire supply chain's costs and decision making is decentralized -i.e., each stage makes independent stocking decisions based on its own cost minimization incentives. Lee and Whang (1996) study a two-stage series system where firms use echelon base-stock policies, penalties for consumer backorders are charged to the lower stage, and the upper stage only attends to her local inventory. The authors propose a nonlinear incentive alignment scheme, under which both firms choose the system optimal base-stock levels. Porteus (1997) considers a similar model and proposes another incentive scheme called responsibility tokens. Chen (1997) studies a multi-stage model where there is a delay between when a firm submits an order and when its supplier receives the order. In his model, however, all firms look to minimize total system costs. He proposes a linear incentive scheme based on accounting inventory, that is, the inventory a firm would have if its supplier filled the orders immediately.
This scheme coordinates the system. Finally, Cachon and Zipkin (1999) study a setting that is closest to our model. Each firm in a two-stage decentralized series system shares a portion of the penalties incurred for consumer backorders. Both firms independently select base-stock levels to minimize their own costs. As in our paper, they consider two games that differ in how the firms track their inventory levels. In the echelon game, both firms use echelon policies, whereas in the local game they use local inventory policies. They compare the equilibrium policies in both games and conclude that the tracking method influences the strategic behavior of the firms.
In addition, for the local inventory tracking game, they introduce a linear transfer payment scheme under which the two firms adopt the system-wide optimal base-stock levels. For a detailed comparison of this scheme with those introduced by Lee and Whang (1996), Porteus (1997) and Chen (1997) , see also Cachon (1999) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and notation.
Section 3 analyzes the decentralized assembly system under echelon policies, while Section 4 considers the system under local base-stock policies. In Section 5, we consider the centralized assembly system and introduce a coordinating transfer payment scheme. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. Finally, an Appendix contains all the proofs.
Model
We consider an assembly system with two firms (firms 2 and 3) supplying components to a final assembler (firm 1). Time is divided into an infinite number of discrete periods. The two suppliers place orders with outside sources having ample supply and constant delivery leadtimes. The leadtime for firm 2 components is L 2 periods, and the leadtime for firm 3 components is L 2 + L 3 periods, with L 3 ≥ 0. Firm 1 places orders with firms 2 and 3 and then assembles one unit of each component into the final product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic, independent across periods and stationary. There is a leadtime of L 1 periods between when the components are shipped from suppliers 2 and 3 and when the finished product is ready for sale at firm 1. Firm i = 2, 3 is charged a holding cost h i , per period for each unit in its stock or in transit to firm 1. (Holding costs for units in transit to firm 1 could easily be charged to firm 1 instead.
Since this cost is constant with respect to firms' decisions, who pays for it has no impact on system behavior.) The assembler's holding cost is H 1 = h 1 + h 2 + h 3 per period for each unit of finished product in its stock and h i , i = 2, 3, for each unit of unmatched component i in stock. We assume that h 2 , h 3 > 0 and that h 1 ≥ 0 represents the additional holding cost corresponding to the added value contained in the finished product. (An incremental carrying cost for holding unmatched components in stock at firm 1's location could also be easily incorporated. We omit it to simplify the presentation.) There are no fixed costs for placing or processing orders. Each firm seeks to minimize its average cost per period. As a result, without loss of generality we assume zero unit purchase and assembly costs.
Unmet demand for finished products is backlogged and all backorders are ultimately filled.
Firm i incurs backorder costs of α i p per period for each unit backordered. As in Cachon and Zipkin (1999) , p represents the total system backorder cost and α i is an (exogenous) share of this cost incurred by firm i, with α i > 0, i = 1, 2, 3 and α 1 + α 2 + α 3 = 1.
The sequence of events during a period is as follows: (1) shipments arrive at each firm;
(2) orders are submitted and shipments are released; (3) consumer demand occurs; (4) holding and penalty costs are charged. In period t after orders but before demand, define the following: IT 3 Decentralized Assembly System: Echelon Policies
Basic Results
In order to follow an echelon base-stock policy, firms 2 and 3 clearly must have downstream visibility -i.e., they can observe their echelon inventory levels and as a result, demand.
For symmetry we also assume that firm 1 has upstream visibility -i.e., it can observe the echelon inventory levels at firms 2 and 3. Firms 2 and 3 follow a pure echelon base-stock policy, under which each period the firms order a sufficient amount to raise their echelon inventory positions to their echelon base-stock levels. Firm 1 follows a modified base-stock policy, ordering up to y 1 = min{s 1 , IL 2t , IL 3t } -i.e., firm 1 will only order matched sets of consists of finished goods and matched sets of components in transit. We now develop the cost functions for firms 1,2 and 3. We denote by a superscript E the cost functions and Nash equilibria under echelon policies.
We first assume that L 3 > 0, i.e., firm 3 has a strictly larger leadtime for components than firm 2. At time t, firm 1's order (and thus its inventory position) depends on IL 2t and IL 3t . To compute IL 2t , note that immediately after placing an order in period t − L 2 , firm 2's (echelon) inventory position equals s 2 , so that
Since demand is stationary and independent across periods, we will often use stationary versions of variables throughout the paper. After ordering in period t, firm 1's
As in Cachon and Zipkin (1999) ,Ĝ 1 (IL 1 − D 1 ) represents the sum of the inventory holding costs and backorder penalty costs at firm 1 in a given period, where:
Based on this, G 1 (IP 1 ) is firm 1's expected cost in period t + L 1 , where we define
Firm 1's cost is then given by:
The quantity G 2 (IP 1 ) represents firm 2's share of backorder costs, where we define G 2 (y) =
is decreasing and convex in y. Firm 2 pays holding costs on inventory in transit to firm 1 (µ L 1 units on average) plus inventory on-hand at firm 2 at the end of time t. Given firm 1's ordering policy, the latter quantity is given by
Note that the third term in (2),
represents the expected number of unmatched components at firm 2.
Similarly, define G 3 (y) = α 3 pE y − D L 1 +1 − which is also decreasing and convex in y, and note that the inventory on-hand at firm 3 at the end of time
Similar to firm 2, E s 3 − s 2 − D L 3 + represents the expected number of unmatched components at firm 3.
The following lemma establishes the first derivatives of the cost functions for the three firms.
Lemma 1
We next show that the decentralized echelon assembly game has a Nash equilibrium.
In addition, we show that the base-stock levels of the suppliers are complements, i.e., an increase in the base-stock level of one of the suppliers induces the other supplier to increase 3 is the unique Nash equilibrium of the echelon decentralized assembly game.
Use of Pipeline Information
Under the base-stock policy analyzed in the preceding section, recall that it is possible to have a mismatch of component inventories -i.e., either firm 2 or firm 3 may have more units in inventory than the other firm. These excess components incur holding costs but provide no benefit, since only matched pairs of components can be used to satisfy end-product demand.
So it would appear to be beneficial to avoid such mismatches. Since firm 3 must place its order before firm 2 (due to its longer leadtime), it does not seem possible to avoid excess units of that firm's component. However, firm 2 could avoid excess units of its component by modifying its ordering policy based on information about firm 3's pipeline inventory (i.e., units on order but not yet delivered).
First, note that firm 2 does not require any explicit information sharing by firm 3 in order to obtain that pipeline information. Firm 2 has downstream visibility and manages its stock with an echelon base-stock level. This implies that firm 2 knows what consumer demand is in each period, and since s 3 is observable firm 2 can infer the amount of pipeline inventory of component 3 at any point in time. Using pipeline information, firm 2 will never want to order more than what it will be able to match with units of components 3 L 2 periods later. This is equal to the amount of component 3 inventory that is within L 2 periods of reaching firm 2 -i.e., s 3 − D L 3 . With this adjustment, firm 2 follows a modified base-stock policy,
In this case, we will refer to the system as the assembly system with information.
While this modification is clearly preferable for firm 2 given a fixed vector of base-stock levels, the change in firm 2's policy may cause the base-stock choices of all three firms to change. As a result, the overall impact of this adjustment on the firms' costs is unclearwe investigate that impact now. We first show how the cost functions of the three firms are related to those considered in §3.1. We will use superscripts EI to denote the costs and equilibrium in the decentralized assembly system under echelon policies, when firm 2 uses information about the pipeline inventory of component 3. 
Lemma 3 Assume firm 1 follows a modified base-stock policy so that IP
However, the cost for firm 2 is given by:
Note that f 
Proposition 2 (i) Ifŝ
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the decentralized echelon assembly game with information.
The following is a corollary of the proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 In the decentralized echelon assembly game with information, the base-stock levels of firms 2 and 3 are complements.
We now compare the equilibria of the decentralized echelon games with and without use of pipeline information. The cost functions for firms 1 and 3 are the same in both games, while the holding cost portion of the cost function for firm 2 is lower when it uses pipeline information, since it avoids mismatches with components from firm 3. Thus, one would expect that firm 2 would be willing to select a higher base-stock level in the game with information. Corollary 1 then suggests that firm 3 would choose a higher base-stock level in response. The following result shows that this is indeed the case. Furthermore, we show that the costs at equilibrium for all the firms are lower in the game with information.
Theorem 1 For the decentralized echelon assembly games with and without use of pipeline
information, we have that:
We now describe a set of test problems for exploring the magnitude of the informationbased cost savings in Theorem 1 part (ii). (We use this same set of problems throughout the paper to illustrate various results and to compare the performance of the assembly system to other related systems.) In order to capture a wide range of possible settings, we consider 108 scenarios, each with a different set of parameters. In all scenarios, demand is Normally distributed with a mean of 10, and we consider two possible values for the standard deviation (2 and 4). In both cases the standard deviation is sufficiently lower than the mean, so that the probability of negative demand is small. The leadtimes are L 1 = 2, L 2 = 2, and L 3 = 1.
We consider two possible penalty cost rates, p = 10 and p = 20, and three possible holding We computed the equilibrium base-stock levels both with and without information for each of the 108 test problems and computed the average cost benefit for each firm when firm 2 uses information. The savings were significant: firm 1's cost dropped by an average of 34%, firm 2's cost dropped by an average of 41%, and firm 3's cost dropped by an average of 31%. (Pipeline inventory costs were excluded from all calculations, since those costs are not affected by the choice of base-stock levels or the use of information.)
Decentralized Series
The manner in which pipeline information is used in the preceding section to modify firm 2's orders matches the policy structure shown to be optimal (by Rosling 1989) for an assembly system under a central decision maker. Rosling also shows that the centralized assembly system is equivalent to a related centralized series system. This raises a natural question: Does this equivalence still hold when decision making is decentralized? We now explore this question.
Following Rosling (1989) , the series system in question has firm 1 placing orders with firm 2, firm 2 placing orders with firm 3, and firm 3 placing orders with an outside source with ample supply. There are constant leadtimes of L 3 , L 2 and L 1 periods for deliveries to firms 3, 2 and 1, respectively. All firms are charged holding costs for the inventory they carry and for the inventory in transit to the immediate downstream firm (for firms 2 and 3). Also, firm i pays a portion α i p of the penalties for consumer backorders. The optimal base-stock levels for the centralized version of the assembly system we consider in this paper are the same as the optimal base-stock levels for the centralized version of this three-stage series system. (Sharing the penalty costs for consumer backorders does not affect the centralized optimal policy.)
The analysis of the above three-stage decentralized series system is related to that of the two-stage decentralized series system investigated by Cachon and Zipkin (1999) . We now derive the cost functions for the three-stage decentralized series system and use these to explore the question of equivalence to the decentralized assembly system.
Consider the echelon inventory positions of the firms after placing orders. Firm 3's echelon inventory position after placing an order in period t − L 2 − L 3 is s 3 . Then, in period t − L 2 prior to firm 2's order, the echelon inventory for firm 3 is
As a result, the echelon inventory position of firm 2 after placing an order in that period is 
t). So after conversion
to stationary echelon variables we have:
The following are then the cost expressions for firms 1, 2 and 3 in the decentralized series system:
Note from (3) and (10), that C R 3 and C EI 3 differ in the average pipeline and in the average number of components 3 (in the language of the assembly system) that are matched with components 2 at firm 2. In the series system, firm 2 is charged for all the sets of matched components that are in stock or in transit to firm 1, whereas firm 3 pays for its own components in the assembly system. Thus the two systems are not equivalent.
In summary, we see that some of the insights from the centralized assembly system carry over to the decentralized system (i.e., using pipeline information is valuable), while others do not (i.e., the assembly system is not equivalent to the related series system).
Equal Supplier Leadtimes
In this subsection, we consider the case where the procurement leadtimes for firms 2 and 3 are equal, i.e., L 3 = 0. In this setting, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the decentralized assembly system to be equivalent to the related two-stage series system.
We begin with the analysis of the decentralized assembly system. We will denote the cost functions and equilibrium base-stock levels in this system with a superscript AeqL (for assembly system with equal leadtimes). Define s ∧ = min{s 2 , s 3 } (we omit the dependence of s ∧ on s 2 and s 3 to simplify notation). The cost functions for the firms in this system can be derived from (1), (2) and (3), and are given by 
Letŝ 
which implies that r 
(This follows from (14) and the fact that
.) It is easy to verify that the left hand side of (16) 
Rosling (1989) showed, under centralized decision making, that when suppliers have equal leadtimes as here, they can be combined in the related series system, resulting in a two-stage system. In that system, the upstream firm (supplier) is charged echelon holding costs of h 2 + h 3 for the units in stock or in transit to firm 1, and pays penalties (1 − α 1 )p for each unit backordered at firm 1, per unit of time. Firm 1 is charged echelon holding costs at a rate H 1 = h 1 +h 2 +h 3 and backorder penalty costs at a rate α 1 p. The leadtime for deliveries to firm 1 is L 1 , and to the supplier is L 2 . We will use the superscript ReqL to denote this two-stage series system. Similarly to (8)-(10), we have that
and
Observe that at equilibrium s 2 > s 1 so that, along the lines of Proposition 3, the decentralized series system has a unique Nash equilibrium s ReqL = (s *
, s
ReqL 2 ), with s
when s 1 = s * 1 . We now compare the above decentralized assembly and series systems. 
Part (i) of Proposition 4 shows that equal fractiles α i p/h i for firms i = 2, 3 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the decentralized assembly system to be equivalent to the related decentralized series system. In that case, the equilibrium base-stock levels for firm 1 coincide in both systems and the supplier's equilibrium base-stock level in the decentralized series system equals the equilibrium base-stock levels for both suppliers in the decentralized assembly system. On the other hand, part (ii) of Proposition 4 stands in contrast to the result for L 3 > 0, in which case the equilibrium base-stock level for firm 2 in the decentralized series system is always lower than the base-stock level for firm 2 in the decentralized assembly system with information.
Decentralized Assembly System: Local Policies
In this section, we consider the decentralized assembly system when firms choose local basestock levels. We use primes to denote local variables, and let s = (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ). In this setting, Similar to the analysis of echelon policies, we first consider the case where firm 2 does not use information about pipeline inventories of component 3 to make its ordering decisions.
We use a superscript L to denote the game with local policies. The cost functions are:
Since firm 2 knows what customer demand is in each period, it can, as in the echelon game, reconstruct the amount of pipeline inventory of component 3 at any point in time. Then, if firm 2 uses information about inventory in transit to firm 3, it will again adjust its ordering policy and follow a modified base-stock policy with order-up-to level min{s 2 , s 3 − D L 3 }. In the context of local policies, the use of pipeline information will not only result in lower average inventories for firm 2 (for a given vector s ), but also for firm 1, since it will prevent firm 1 from receiving unmatched units of component 2. We use a superscript LI to denote the assembly game under local policies with information, and the cost functions are given by:
Following the derivation of Lemma 1, we present the following result without proof.
Lemma 4
From the expressions in (21) − (23), it is easy to verify that C L i is convex in s i for i = 1, 2, 3, guaranteeing the existence of a Nash equilibrium (see Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). In addition, we now show that the equilibrium is unique. We now establish a comparison of the equilibrium base-stock levels for the local decentralized assembly games with and without information. In addition, we compare the echelon base-stock levels arising from the echelon and local decentralized assembly games with information.
Lemma 5 The local decentralized assembly game without information has a unique
+ s 3 − x 2 − x 3 ≤ s * 1 for x 2 ≥ s 3 − x 3 , we have that ∂C L 1 ∂s 1 (s * 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) < G 1 (s * 1 ) s 2 0 Φ L 3 (s 3 − x)φ L 2 (x)dx = 0,(30)f LI 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) = h 2 Φ L 2 (s 2 ) + ∞ s 2 G 2 (s 1 + s 2 − x)φ L 2 (x)dx,(31)
Proposition 6 Let s
LI be an equilibrium in the local game with information. Then, Recall that in the decentralized assembly system under echelon base-stock policies, all firms benefit when the supplier with the shorter leadtime, firm 2, uses information about firm 3's pipeline inventory to make its stocking decisions. Interestingly, this no longer holds under local base-stock policies. That is, using pipeline information may actually increase costs for some firms (including the firm that makes direct use of the information). Using the set of test problems described in Section 3.2, we conducted a numerical study to explore this issue. We found that firms 2 and/or 3 could see an increase in their average costs if firm 2 modifies its policy to account for the inventory in transit to firm 3. Indeed, we found that in 33% (38%) of the scenarios firm 2 (3) was worse off with information, while in 23% of the scenarios both firms saw an increase in their average costs with the use of information.
On the other hand, in all 108 scenarios, firm 1 and the aggregate assembly system benefited when firm 2 uses pipeline information to make its ordering decisions, even after the changes experienced by the local base-stock levels of all firms, as described in Proposition 6(a). These observations strengthen the distinction between echelon and local base-stock policies in a decentralized assembly system: not only are they strategically different as can be concluded from the results in Proposition 6(b), but they can also differ substantially in the value of using information.
We now briefly consider the decentralized series system under local policies. We show that, in this setting, there exists a Nash equilibrium and the behavior of the equilibrium policies differs in a fundamental way from those of the decentralized assembly system under local policies (with and without information).
Proposition 7 In the decentralized series system under local polices there is a Nash equilibrium in local base-stock levels. Furthermore, the local base-stock levels are pair-wise substitutes, i.e., the optimal base-stock level for each firm decreases with the base-stock levels of the other two firms.
Combining Propositions 6 and 7 we see that some insights from decentralized series systems (as studied by Cachon and Zipkin 1999 ) carry over to decentralized assembly systems, while some do not. The relationships among base-stock levels in Proposition 6(b) agree with behavior in the series system, but s 2 and s 3 are complements in the assembly system while they are substitutes in the series system. Since complementary base-stock levels facilitate the use of supermodular game techniques (e.g., to compute the equilibrium, to derive comparative statics results, to make other comparisons as in Proposition 6), this system provides a somewhat unusual example of a situation in which an assembly system has nicer structural properties than a series system. Proposition 7 implies that, like in the echelon games, the decentralized local assembly systems with and without information are not equivalent to the decentralized local series system. It suffices to compare the dependence of the base-stock levels of firms 2 and 3. These are complements in the assembly systems, but they are substitutes in the series system.
Centralized Assembly System and Coordination
In this section, we characterize the set of echelon base-stock levels that minimizes the total system-wide costs in the assembly system, and introduce a payment scheme between firm 1 and the suppliers that ensures that all firms in the decentralized system select the system-wide optimal base-stock levels. We design the payment scheme to coordinate the decentralized assembly system with information, since we showed in Section 3.2 that, under echelon base-stock policies, all firms benefit when firm 2 uses information about firm 3's pipeline inventory.
When the firms in the assembly system operate as decentralized entities, their stocking decisions fail to consider the impact that these decisions have on the other firms. Thus, the aggregate costs in the decentralized system are generally higher than those achieved under centralized control, where a single firm or manager makes the stocking or policy decisions for the entire assembly system in order to minimize aggregate costs. Indeed, for the 108 sample problems described in Section 3.2, the gap between the decentralized and the centralized assembly systems was on average 46%, and as high as 64% in some scenarios. (Again, pipeline inventory costs were excluded from the calculations.) Thus, the potential gains from coordinating the system can be substantial.
As reviewed in §3.3, the centralized optimal policy for the assembly system can be constructed based on the optimal echelon base-stock levels in a related series system (see Rosling 1989) . Based on this and on the results in Chen and Zheng (1994) , we have that the centralized optimal base-stock levels s 0 are given by:
, without loss of optimality we can simply modify firm i's base-stock level to be s 0 i+1 . We now present one possible coordination scheme that combines additional penalties on the suppliers for backorders of the final product with subsidies based on component inventories. We denote by T 12 (s) (T 13 (s)) the transfer payment from firm 2 (firm 3) to firm 1 as a function of the base-stock levels s. Let
Recall that both firms i = 2, 3 already pay a fraction α i of the penalty incurred for backorders.
The first term of each transfer payment causes both suppliers to pay the entire backlogging penalty plus an additional amount per unit backordered equal to the installation holding cost H 1 . On the other hand, the second term of each payment represents an inventory holding cost subsidy that each firm receives for all matched components in stock at these firms (due to low orders by firm 1), i.e.,
Finally, the third term represents an additional cross-supplier subsidy received by each firm. Firm 2 is subsidized based on the number of unmatched components held by firm 3, while firm 3 is subsidized based on the amount by which it constrains firm 2's order below s 2 (due to shortages in firm 3's pipeline). The cross-supplier nature of these payments reflects the need for horizontal coordination in an assembly system. (The expressions for T 12 and T 13 were given using the s i
and expected values to facilitate the arguments that follow. However, note that the payment scheme could be implemented based on actual quantities observed each period.) Firm 1's average cost after the transfer payment,C
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, it follows thatC EI 1 (s) is quasiconvex in s 1 . When firms 2 and 3 choose the base-stock levels s 0 2 and s 0 3 , respectively, the derivative ofC EI 1 with respect to s 1 is
which, by (32), is solved by s The cost function for firm 2, after the transfer payment to firm 1, is given bỹ 
which, by (33), is solved by s 0 2 . Finally, for firm 3, the cost function after the transfer payment to firm 1 is given bỹ
The derivative ofC EI 3 (s) with respect to s 3 is:
It is easy to verify that ∂ 2C EI for i = 1 or i = 2, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in the decentralized assembly system with information under the transfer payments T 1i , i = 2, 3, given by the centralized optimal vector of base-stock levels s 0 .
Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed an assembly system with decentralized decision making. Under both echelon and local base-stock policies we showed that a Nash equilibrium exists, and we established some properties of the equilibrium base-stock levels. In addition, we analyzed the use of pipeline inventory information, and also compared the behavior of the decentralized assembly system to related systems that have been studied in the literature.
Our results indicate that some insights from related models continue to hold in this setting, but that others do not. For the echelon model, using pipeline information is beneficial (to all firms) -this matches what was previously known about centralized assembly systems.
However, in contrast to known results for centralized assembly systems, the decentralized assembly system is not equivalent to the analogous decentralized series system. For the local model, using pipeline information may actually increase costs for some firms (including the firm that makes direct use of the information).
As in the decentralized series system, we find that the local base-stock policy leads to higher base-stock levels than the echelon base-stock policy. Also, firm 1's base-stock level is a substitute for the base-stock levels of firms 2 and 3. However, unlike the series system, the base-stock levels of firms 2 and 3 are complements in the assembly system, yielding a more convenient problem structure than in the series system.
In general we found that the equilibrium base-stock vector for each of these games is not the same as the optimal base-stock vector for a similar system with a central decision maker.
However, we described a system of linear transfer payments that coordinates the supply chain. In addition to penalties on backorders and subsidies of (part of) each supplier's own inventory, this payment scheme includes cross-supplier subsidies that depend on inventories or ordering decisions by the other supplier. This feature reflects the parallel nature of assembly systems and the resulting need for horizontal coordination in such systems.
1 , we consider three cases:
We can now compute:
. Similar to (35), we have that
We now compute ∂E[g 2 ]/∂s 2 :
On the other hand,
We then have:
Thus,
As for firm 2, we have
Then,
Proof of Lemma 2. We first show that C E 2 and C E 3 are convex in s 2 and s 3 , respectively. From Lemma 1 we have:
since G 2 (·) is decreasing and convex. Also,
since G 3 (·) is decreasing and convex.
For any fixed value of s 1 , define r E 2 (s 3 |s 1 ) and r E 3 (s 2 |s 1 ) to be the reaction functions for the suppliers, in the resulting two-player game. Since C E 2 and C E 3 are convex, the reaction functions are well defined, and they are determined by the roots of (5) and (6), respectively.
Again from Lemma 1, we have that:
This shows that, for any fixed s 1 , the inventory game between the suppliers is supermodular and has a Nash equilibrium. Finally, it is easy to verify that
Proof of Lemma 3. For firms 1 and 3 the result follows directly by replacing s 2 by IP 2 in
(1) and (3). For firm 2, making a similar substitution in (2) yields C 
Condition (41) follows from the following second order derivatives:
Proof of Proposition 5. The existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) . The result then follows from (30), and the proof of Lemma 5. (In the local game with information, note that firm 2's best response is equal toŝ LI 2 (s 1 ) if this quantity is less than s 3 . Otherwise, any s 2 ≥ s 3 is a best response to the other firms' strategies. In this case, firm 2's decision has no impact on the other firms -as was also noted in the echelon game with information. Ifŝ LI 2 (s 1 ) ≥ s 3 , we then define firm 2's reaction function to be equal to s 3 .)
From (26) and (29) Thus, the result follows from Corollary 1, Theorem 2.5 in Vives (2000) , and a similar argument to that of part (a).
Proof of Proposition 7.
Following (8)- (10), we have
Denote by r RL i the reaction function of firm i. Since G 1 (·) is convex, it follows that r RL 1 (s 2 , s 3 ) is decreasing in s 2 and s 3 . For firm 2, it is easy to verify that
It is immediate to note from (42) 
